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The Strategic Importance of Top Management Resistance: 
Extending Alfred D. Chandler 
 
Martin Friesl, Lancaster University Management School 
Winston Kwon, University of Edinburgh Business School 
 
 
“Durant had reviewed the proposal but had failed to act on it. To this builder of 
empires, the details of organization seemed unimportant.” (Alfred D. Chandler on 
the reorganization of General Motors, p. 130) 
Introduction 
It is widely accepted that strategic change is an emergent process (Balogun, 2006; 
Balogun and Johnson, 2005; Mintzberg, 2000; Mirabeau and Maguire, 2014), and 
increasingly understood that strategic agency (Mantere, 2008) resides beyond the top 
management team and that strategizing activities are distributed across the organization 
and at different levels (Birkinshaw, 1997; Floyd and Lane, 2000; Garud and Karnøe, 
2005; Lechner and Floyd, 2012; Mantere, 2005; Regnér, 2003). These dispersed and 
‘autonomous’ activities are a significant resource for strategic change as they can 
contest and even counteract existing strategy and thus provide new emergent avenues 
for strategic development (Burgelman, 1983b; Burgelman, 1983a; Burgelman, 2002; 
Howard-Grenville, 2007; Lechner and Floyd, 2012). 
Considering the inherent tension and conflict that such autonomous initiatives can 
engender, it is unsurprising that top management teams often react with resistance 
(Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle, 1999; Burgelman, 1983b; Hisrich and Kearney, 2012; 
O'Reilly III and Tushman, 2013). Birkinshaw and Ridderstråle (1999) use the term 
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‘corporate immune system’ to describe the tendency of senior managers to resist and 
reject strategic initiatives from below. Although ostensibly for protecting and 
reinforcing the firm’s existing strategic path (Burgelman, 2002; Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Sydow et al., 2009), we propose that this resistance may also have ‘generative’ effects 
that ultimately and paradoxically facilitate strategic change (Ford et al., 2008; Thomas 
and Davies, 2005). It is these generative consequences of top management resistance to 
strategic initiatives that we focus upon in this paper.  
The generative effects of top management resistance have not sustained scholarly 
attention as evidence for this is dispersed and comes from a variety of research areas. 
An early account of these effects can be found in Alfred Chandler’s book ‘Strategy and 
Structure’	 (Chandler Jr, 1962), which describes how top management resistance to 
proposals for reorganization at DuPont ultimately improved the speed and outcome of 
the strategic changes implemented. This is supported by research that reveals how 
resistance can facilitate change by allowing actors to develop initiatives over time (Ford 
et al., 2008). Studies on issue selling illustrate how key actors develop capabilities and 
learn appropriate moves to influence strategy as a pre-emptive response to anticipated 
resistance from senior managers (Dutton et al., 2001; Howard-Grenville, 2007). More 
generally, research on top management team decision making processes emphasize that 
disagreements about strategic options and their synthesis can improve the quality of 
decisions reached (Amason, 1996). 
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While these disparate studies validate the importance of resistance for strategic 
change, they also reveal the limits of our understanding (Howard-Grenville, 2007). 
Initiatives are often portrayed as singular events that cease to exist once proposals to top 
management have been accepted and implemented or rejected (Birkinshaw, 1997). 
These studies however, provide evidence that autonomous strategic initiatives can be 
understood as ‘sequential games’ (Axelrod, 1983)	 that unfold over longer time scales. 
They can develop a life of their own, below the gaze of top management, waiting for the 
right moment to re-emerge.  
Autonomous Action, Top Management Resistance and Strategic Change 
In making our case for the generative role of resistance, we first critique the prevailing 
view of top management resistance as a consequence of autonomous initiatives and 
therefore a threat to strategic change. We then respond with diverse arguments 
suggesting how resistance can be a facilitator for change. 
 
Top Management Resistance in Strategy Process Research 
Strategy process research has long acknowledged that strategy development is a 
complex and contested process involving multiple parties (Bower, 1970; Mirabeau and 
Maguire, 2014). In his seminal work, Bower (1970) examines the budgeting process of 
firms to demonstrate how strategic actions do not necessarily follow a top-down path, 
rather they are influenced and shaped by bottom-up autonomous actions. Burgelman 
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(1983c) elucidates the conditions under which autonomous actions are more or less 
successful and how a firm’s strategic and structural context can determine which 
initiatives prevail (Burgelman, 1991; Burgelman, 1983b). While the strategic context 
describes a firm’s	 strategic intent, the structural context encompasses organizational 
processes and routines that influence the extent to which actors are able and 
incentivized to support these initiatives (Balogun et al., 2005). Such initiatives require 
either the mobilization of substantial political influence (Lechner and Floyd, 2012) or 
changes to the organization’s strategic and the structural context that would otherwise 
impede their development and implementation (Balogun and Floyd, 2010). 
Studies on the role of autonomous initiatives in large organizations often use the term 
‘corporate entrepreneurship’ to juxtapose initiative-driven change against development 
through induced strategy processes (Birkinshaw, 1997; Burgelman, 1983c; Hisrich and 
Kearney, 2012). Initiatives are conceived of as an “essentially… entrepreneurial 
process, beginning with the identification of an opportunity and culminating in the 
commitment of resources to that opportunity”	(Birkinshaw, 1997, p. 207). These studies 
demonstrate how initiatives often originate with middle managers, and require vertical 
and horizontal influencing actions in order to be realized (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000; 
Lechner and Floyd, 2012). Top management resistance to autonomous initiatives is also 
implicit in research on issue selling (Dutton, 1993; Dutton and Jackson, 1987). Howard-
Grenville (2007) describes how issue sellers develop capabilities for issue selling such 
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as “formal approaches that match prevailing cultural norms (asserting decision 
processes), customize their moves to an audience (offering explanations), prepare 
carefully by educating themselves and assembling information on the issue (working 
within constraints, providing data), and move opportunistically to advance issues when 
they might be most salient….” (p. 568) to influence and overcome the resistance of their 
top management team. 
These disparate perspectives highlight autonomous strategic initiatives as an 
important source of change, extant research still tends to frame resistance as a primary 
factor behind the failure of change initiatives. Top management resistance, they argue, 
reduces the consideration of alternative strategic options, thus creating or reinforcing a 
strategic path that a firm might find hard to deviate from (Garud et al., 2010; Leonard-
Barton, 1992; Schreyogg and Sydow, 2011; Sydow et al., 2009). 
The generative role of resistance: An emerging view 
Organizational change research also makes an implicit case that employee resistance 
might actually be a catalyst for strategic change (Ford et al., 2008; Thomas and Davies, 
2005). In focusing on change through the implementation of a top down strategic intent, 
Ford et al. (2008) argue that resistance extends the process by facilitating conversations 
(even if negative), it also enables initiators of change (they refer to change agents) to 
“clarify and further legitimize the change […]”	(p. 368). While not explicitly referring 
to resistance per se, Amason (1996) shows that within top management teams, conflict 
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and disagreement “appears to be important for high-quality decisions”	 (p. 127) by 
enabling the ‘synthesis’	of different perspectives. While these studies acknowledge that 
resistance does have generative effects, there is clearly an absence of theorization about 
these effects, leading us to ask: What are the consequences of top management 
resistance to strategic initiatives above and beyond maintaining the status quo of the 
organization? This question demands a closer examination of the evolution of strategic 
initiatives over time.  
The Implications of Top Management Resistance: The Case of 
Strategic Change at DuPont 
A cogent case for the relevance of and thus the need for research on top management 
resistance is Alfred D. Chandler’s historical study of the emergence of the M-form at 
the beginning of the 20th century. The granular detail of Chandler’s account enables us 
to capture some of the mechanisms through which resistance shapes emergent strategy. 
As Whittington observes, “[in] Chandler’s account, strategy and organization are not 
abstract concepts or variables, but sheer hard work”	 (Whittington, 2008: , p. 273). 
Crucially, in the conclusion to ‘Strategy and Structure’	where he contrasted change at 
DuPont, General Motors, Sears Roebuck and Standard Oil, Chandler seemed puzzled by 
some of the evidence: 
“Only at du Pont was there any explicit resistance to the recommendation of the 
innovators […] There the President, Irénée, twice turned down the proposal […] 
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Possibly just because of Irénée’s [President of DuPont] strong resistance, the 
initial changes at du Pont were the most clear-cut and required the least 
subsequent amending of any of the four reorganizations studied.” (Chandler, 
1962, p. 305f) 
The case of DuPont intriguingly reveals a generative interplay between strategic 
initiatives and resistance of the top management team (Chandler, 1962, p. 52-113), 
which we build on and extend by focusing on how key actors responded to top 
management resistance. We then identify and highlight three key mechanisms related to 
top management resistance that contributed to the firm’s successful reorganization. 
These mechanisms are: (1) reframing, (2) restructuring and (3) recoupling of initiatives. 
Reframing refers to the process by which managers present initiatives, restructuring 
involves changes in the group of people involved and, finally, recoupling, involves 
making initiatives part of formal decision-making.  
The Initiative to Transform DuPont 
In the aftermath of WWI, DuPont evolved from a company focused primarily on 
explosives into a highly diversified conglomerate whose product range included soap, 
film, paint, varnish and dye stuffs. Despite this increasing complexity, the firm retained 
its increasingly problematic functional departmental structure, which exacerbated 
tensions and conflict for various functions such as sales, marketing, but also 
procurement. A series of projects staffed by the heads of the various functional 
departments but carried out by some of their direct subordinates, were initiated in 1920 
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to investigate this problem. The objective was to study how DuPont should be 
organized based on a comparative analysis of similar American firms. The conclusion 
was clear: “the underlying problem was not one of selling but of organization”	(p. 95), 
as the committee thus proposed a fundamental reorganization to “make product rather 
than function the basis of the organization”	(p. 96) 
Mechanism 1: Resistance and the Reframing of Initiatives 
This initial proposal to reorganize DuPont was rejected by the Executive Committee. 
President Irénée DuPont was uncomfortable with the idea that the firm should change 
the very principles of organization that had made it successful as it was a key factor in 
enabling the rapid scaling up of production capacity and the effective coordination of 
logistics across its gunpowder mills during WWI. The project team was tasked with 
improving the study for resubmission to the Executive Committee. This second attempt 
of persuading the executive team to agree to reorganization however resulted in the 
same outcome. DuPont should remain as it was.  
Departmental managers were disappointed as the current structure was increasingly 
dysfunctional at the operational level. Although the initiative to reorganize DuPont was 
officially cancelled, three managers from the Sales, Manufacturing and Development 
Departments respectively, took initiative to “meet ‘unofficially and without portfolio’ to 
consider ways of improving the company’s performance” (p. 100). This ‘informal 
council’ discussed issues, particularly regarding the paint business, across departmental 
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boundaries. While the team’s ultimate intention was to eventually formalize this paint 
council as a de facto product division, they avoided the term ‘organization’	in any report 
to the executive committee. To deflect attention from true motivations, they, instead 
named their proposal: “A Plan to Make 10% on Our Paint and Varnish Net Sales” (p. 
100). The plan was immediately accepted by the Executive Committee, and soon after, 
the same group of managers submitted a further proposal to broaden the ad hoc 
‘council’ structure to most other product lines. Again, they “did not raise the question of 
organization, but rather made their recommendations in a report on statistical controls.” 
By the start of 1921, most product lines were coordinated through these councils. 
Despite the Executive Committee’s rejection of the initial plan the “DuPont Company 
was beginning to move toward a de facto structure based on product divisions rather 
than functional departments”	(p. 103). 
Mechanism 2: Resistance and the Restructuring of Initiatives 
The reframing of this initiative as one of ‘profitability’	 rather than ‘organization’	also 
went hand in hand with the restructuring of the group of actors taking it forward. The 
initial reorganization initiative involved a group of managers hand-picked by the top 
management team: the “heads of the Sales, Treasurer’s, Development Departments […] 
and A. Felix du Pont, General Manager of the Explosives Manufacturing Department”	
plus a sub-committee of “one able representative from each department plus one of the 
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President’s assistants.”	 (p. 94) Yet, after the rejection of the initial proposal to the 
executive team, this sub-committee ceased to formally exist.  
As part of the reframing of this initiative however, the small group of actors 
expanded to include a small core of executives that had been involved with the initial 
proposal: Pickard (Head of the Sales Department), Carpenter (Head of the Development 
Department) and MacGregor (Representative of the Development Department). In 
addition to these three individuals, another two joined the ‘informal council’. This 
expanded group had a rather narrower focus than its predecessor. Rather than 
addressing the situation of DuPont as a whole, the ‘informal council’	 now recruited 
managers with expertise in the paint business. Moreover, with the formalization of these 
councils, a growing group of managers across DuPont started to engage in cross-
departmental coordination. 
Mechanism 3: Resistance and the Recoupling of Initiatives 
While the idea of councils was quickly embraced, the functional organizational structure 
remained in place. Rather than transforming the firm, the council was yet another 
management layer that required coordination across functional departments. It was soon 
apparent that the council	solution did not go far enough, and it thus short-lived. As a 
way forward, and despite its previous rejection, the initial proposal for establishing 
product divisions was again discussed by the top management team. Put simply, the 
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initiative that had continued below the gaze of top management had now re-emerged to 
recouple with the formal decision-making process at DuPont. 
The deepening of the post-war recession compounded the pressure on DuPont to act. 
Although explosives still earned $2.5m in profits, all other products lost a total of 
$3.8m. The executive committee still waited to take any action until Irénée returned 
from a business trip. Fletcher Brown, a manager in the Smokeless Powder Division, 
took initiative and wrote directly to Irénée, proposing that:  
“The trouble with the Company is right here in Wilmington, and the failure is the 
failure of administration for which we, as Directors, are responsible.” (p. 105) 
In this letter, Brown referred to the initial proposal made to the executive committee 
in the previous year and recommended that the “centralized functionally 
departmentalized organization structure should be completely replaced” (p. 105). 
Eventually, in a joint executive meeting in August 1921, Brown was asked to develop a 
detailed implementation plan. The original proposal of 1920 served as a blueprint for 
Brown’s plan, with only addition being measures to improve the structure and function 
of the Executive Committee itself. While Irénée remained unconvinced of the necessity 
to abandon the functional organization that has served the company so well, ‘in 
deference’ to the opinion to the majority of the executive committee (p. 110), he voted 
in favor of the new structure and “[i]n September, 1921, the DuPont Company put into 
effect this new structure of autonomous, multi-departmental divisions […]” (p. 111).  
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Strategic Change at DuPont: Resistance and the Maturation of Strategic Initiatives 
The initiative to reorganize Du Pont into product divisions followed anything but a 
linear path of development and implementation. Rather it emerged through iterative 
cycles of overt (and partly covert) proposals and initiatives triggered by the resistance of 
the executive committee and particularly through the resistance of DuPont’s President 
Irénée. Chandler saw the resistance of Irénée as instrumental to the process of 
maturation that sharpened the quality and practical adequacy of plans to implement the 
reorganization initiative. 
“Thus the manner in which the realization came of organizational inadequacies 
affected the nature of the resulting proposals. This, in turn, helped to determine 
the length of time involved in bringing the plan to fruition.”	(p. 305)  
Indeed, as part of the general discussion of the four cases discussed in ‘Strategy and 
Structure’	Chandler explicitly juxtaposes the cases of DuPont case and General Motors. 
Similar to DuPont, the initiative for reorganization came from a middle manager; in this 
case Alfred P. Sloan, Jr. He also did a study of competitors in order to make his case for 
change. In contrast with DuPont however, Sloan’s proposal was immediately and 
unconditionally accepted. Its implementation however, was fraught with difficulty and 
took far longer to be fully realized as “[t]he final definition of a comparable structure 
took longer at General Motors, for Sloan, Brown, and Pratt [Executives at GM] had 
more creative work to do”	(Chandler Jr, 1962, p. 306). 
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The generative dynamics of top-down resistance are still apparent today. For 
example, the development of numerous new product initiatives at Apple are directly 
attributable to resistance by Steve Jobs, Jonathan Ives and other senior executives who 
were known to push back on middle management proposals with demands for further 
iterations of elaboration and refinement (Brown, 2011; Lashinski, 2012). By contrast, 
the failures of Microsoft to successfully pivot to the mobile computing paradigm and 
Google’s problems new product initiatives such as Google Glass and Nest has been 
attributed to a lack of senior management oversight, or as we term here, generative 
resistance, which often led to the premature launch of underdeveloped technology 
platforms (Amadeo, 2016; Eichenwald, 2012; Bilton, 2015). 
The Strategic Importance of Top Management Resistance 
Chandler wrote the DuPont case with the intention of explaining the emergence of the 
multidivisional form. Yet, by choosing to tell the story from the perspective of the 
acting executives, he also afforded insight into the role of resistance for the near death 
of an initiative, its subsequent resurrection and ultimate implementation. These cases 
illustrate how change unfolds through the dialectic (Seo and Creed, 2002) relationship 
between autonomous initiatives and the strategic intent of top management.  
Furthermore, it also demonstrates that resistance is a crucial catalyst for strategic 
change – not only in the implementation stage as emphasized in extant research, but 
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also in the strategy formation stage (see Table 1). The objective of this essay then, is to 
encourage further research into the role of top management resistance. The mechanisms 
described above, we propose, can provide an entry point for such research. We now 
describe these mechanisms in greater detail and then identify avenues for future 
research. In Table 1 we juxtapose the generative role of resistance as discussed in 
current research with Chandler’s original interpretation, our extension and suggestions 
for future research. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------- 
Generative Mechanisms of Top Management Resistance 
Chandler’s cases demonstrate how initiatives are dynamic phenomena that transform 
over time when confronted with resistance. While the initial resistance of the Executive 
Committee halted formal activity, the first generative mechanism of reframing saw the 
initiative recast as one of improving ‘performance’, which	 allowed managers to ‘go 
underground’	 and gradually recruit commitment upwards from the top management 
team, and also downwards from other functional heads. This gradual expansion of the 
practice of ‘councils’	 across the various product lines enabled the firm to gain 
capabilities for coordinating across the functional boundaries of the organization. The 
case indicates that the actions and language used by middle managers are tailored to 
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mitigate resistance, such as avoiding the term ‘reorganization’. Indeed, managers 
strategically used accepted practices such as ‘councils’	 as well as the objective of 
‘profitability’	 in order reframe the initiative as less risky and thus more legitimate 
(Canales and Vila, 2005). We consider such reframing to be a generative effect of top 
management resistance as it facilitated the transformation of the initiative. To 
understand the intricate ways by which initiatives are shaped by top management 
resistance therefore, we call for more research that follows strategic initiatives over time 
to capture their transformation and manifold representations. The growing literature on 
framing and framing contests for example, could provide a theoretically nuanced entry 
point for such analysis (Kaplan, 2008; Pandza, 2011).  
A second generative mechanism of top management resistance is the restructuring of 
the group of actors involved in taking the initiative forward, despite top management 
resistance. The initial committee tasked with a study of the ‘organization’	was staffed 
with the most senior managers, but as Pickard and Carpenter started to reframe the 
problem, they were joined by mid-level operational managers who had a strong 
expertise in their respective domains and were keen to remedy the dysfunctional 
functional structure. Thus, rather than remaining at a ‘corporate’ level, restructuring 
shifted the focus of the initiative downwards and closer to the firm’s operational level, 
whose managers were instrumental in quickly spreading the practice of informal 
councils across the firm. This insight relates directly to several central concerns of 
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recent strategy practice and process research, including: the differential role of various 
actors in strategy work (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007; Paroutis et al., 2013; Vaara and 
Whittington, 2012; Whittington, 2006); the role of middle managers more specifically 
(Balogun and Johnson, 2004; Rouleau, 2005); and how strategy work is distributed 
across the organization (Garud and Karnøe, 2005; Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007; 
Pandza, 2011). This insight also highlights that the distributed nature of strategy work 
has implications for performance, as shown in Martin and Eisenhardt’s (2010) study of 
cross-business unit collaboration.  
Chandler’s account of DuPont also highlights a third generative mechanism, which is 
the recoupling of initiatives to the strategy process of the firm. Recoupling involves the 
formal allocation of resources to a strategic initiative. While the informal council 
created a more product oriented organization, the firm’s assets remained within 
functional departments. It is the recoupling of the proposal to reorganize with the firm’s 
induced strategy process and the imperative to cope with the effects of the great 
depression, which won over the financial and political support of the executive 
committee (apart from Irénée). This extends Burgelman (2002) argument that it is these 
autonomous initiatives, rather than induced strategy that drives strategic change, and 
that commitment to a particular strategy might require structural changes before 
autonomous initiatives can be restarted (Burgelman, 2002; Mirabeau and Maguire, 
2014).  
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The relationship between resistance and the generative mechanisms reframing, 
restructuring, and recoupling, and its implications for the maturation of initiatives also 
offer new insights into the antecedents of emergent strategy and strategic change. 
Arguably, Chandler’s analysis implies that top management resistance ultimately 
improved not only the quality of the initiative but also the ability of the organization to 
absorb radically new ideas. Indeed, the informal council at DuPont was an ad hoc 
attempt to bridge functional boundaries in the absence of a formal change in the 
organizational structure. As Chandler points out, although the initiative to reorganize 
had the longest gestation period, the actual implementation of the M-form at DuPont 
was ultimately the most brief and smoothest of all the cases described.  
Future research on the generative role of resistance for strategic change 
While reframing, restructuring and recoupling helps to explain how and why the 
initiative the initiative at DuPont matured over time, we cannot claim an exhaustive 
listing of the generative mechanisms of resistance. Rather, our interpretation of 
Chandler’s case indicates a need for further research on resistance and the 
organizational change through autonomous initiatives (see Table 1).  
The mechanisms identified in this paper require further elaboration. Future studies 
could elaborate upon these mechanisms and identify additional mechanisms. Indeed, 
further effects regarding the work of individual managers might be uncovered, such as 
those related to identity. Moreover, future research could develop a typology of the 
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generative mechanisms of resistance and theorize the processual dynamic of these 
mechanisms. We suggest that a more comprehensive picture of these generative 
mechanisms is needed to account for resistance, which invariably emerges at different 
organizational levels (e.g. top management, middle management, etc.), during the 
formation and implementation phases of strategy, thus potentially resulting in radically 
divergent outcomes for strategic change. Such research however, requires sensitivity to 
different governance contexts as firms with complex stakeholder dynamics such as large 
public companies might experience different forms of management resistance in 
comparison to, for instance, entrepreneurial ventures or family firms. Therefore, we 
propose the study of initiatives, within context, as an appropriate unit of analysis with 
which to study the dynamic interplay of downward and upward resistance.  
The relationship between resistance and maturation also raises important questions 
about the temporal dimension of top management decision making, a concept pointed 
out by Chandler (which he referred to as ‘delay’) and more recently addressed in Kaplan 
and Orlikowski’s (2013) study on temporal work. It emphasizes that strategic change is 
not only concerned with identifying potential futures for the organization but is also 
influenced by the temporal situatedness of initiatives (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Friesl and Silberzahn, 2012). Indeed, the DuPont case suggests that the ‘timing’ of 
initiatives and proposals to the top management team was crucial. Strategy research 
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would benefit from greater insight into how decisions serve to postpone or expedite 
strategic change initiatives. 
While resistance has generative effects, the absence of resistance does not preclude 
successful attempts at strategic change. Furthermore, resistance can and does have 
severe negative consequences as suggested by extant research. Therefore, we ask not 
whether or not resistance in itself is ‘good’ for strategic change, but rather we seek to 
better understand how the presence or absence of resistance influences the dynamic of 
strategic change initiatives. For example, what are the sources of top management 
resistance, and under what conditions can resistance serve as a catalyst for change and 
when does it promote inertia? Addressing these questions will require multiple 
theoretical entry points ranging from political to behavioral perspectives and also poses 
research design challenges due to the time span involved in following initiatives within 
organizations. Detailed historical case studies such as Pettigrew’s (1985) study of ICI, 
Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1998) analysis of the transformation of large multi-nationals 
like Philips, Burgelman’s (2002) account of strategic evolution at Intel or indeed 
Chandler’s work can afford us the opportunity to capture the unfolding of initiatives 
over time. Therefore, illuminating the boundary conditions of generative mechanisms of 
resistance implies a need to become more familiar with the method of the historian 
(Kipping and Lamberg, 2016; Durand and Vaara, 2009; Vaara and Lamberg, 2015). At 
the very least, it requires sensitivity to the broader historical organizational context 
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(Vaara & Lamberg, 2015) in which the relationship between resistance and initiatives 
unfold. 
Conclusion: A Plea for Further Research  
For Chandler, the reorganization of DuPont was an example of organizational 
innovation that was not only a rational response to a turbulent environment but also a 
nuanced social process. Resistance was a crucial catalyst of this process that enabled the 
management team to better engage with the fundamental challenges facing their firm. 
This is the underpinning of our argument that research on top management resistance 
has great potential to further illuminate how organizations evolve. We drew upon the 
DuPont case to identify and illustrate how the process of resistance its generative 
mechanisms (i.e. reframing, restructuring and recoupling) can facilitate the maturation 
and refinement of initiatives for strategic change. In so doing, this case underscores how 
top management resistance is not separate, but rather integral to the process of strategy 
emergence. Building on our interpretation and extension of Chandler’s case and echoing 
prior research on organizational change (Ford et al., 2008; Thomas and Davies, 2005), 
we therefore make a plea for more research on the ‘generative’ mechanisms of 
resistance in future (Ford et al., 2008; Thomas & Davies, 2005).   
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